Play repeated rounds against classic strategies and watch cooperation pay off — or not.
Understand why rational players defect in a one-shot game, yet cooperation can emerge when the game is repeated.
With Tit-for-Tat selected, play Cooperate for several rounds.
Before you act, predict what will happen. How does the opponent respond to your cooperation? Then do it — did your prediction match what happened?
Cooperates first, then copies whatever you did last round.
| Your move | Opp. Cooperate | Opp. Defect |
|---|---|---|
| You Cooperate | 3 / 3 | 0 / 5 |
| You Defect | 5 / 0 | 1 / 1 |
Cumulative score
Total points each side has earned as rounds accumulate.
The prisoner's dilemma is the most famous problem in game theory: a situation where two players, each acting in their own rational self-interest, end up worse off than if they had cooperated. Each player chooses to cooperate or defect. Whatever the other does, defecting gives a higher personal payoff — so defection is the dominant strategy, and mutual defection is the Nash equilibrium, the outcome from which no one can improve by changing their move alone. The tragedy is that mutual cooperation would have left both better off, yet rational individual choice drives them to the worse outcome. That is why it captures so many real situations — arms races, price wars, overfishing, climate action — where individually sensible choices produce a collectively bad result. The twist comes with repetition. When the game is played over and over, cooperation can emerge, because players can reward and punish each other across rounds. The classic strategy is tit-for-tat: cooperate first, then copy whatever the opponent did last. Being nice, retaliatory, forgiving, and clear, it shows how the shadow of the future can sustain cooperation that a one-shot game destroys.
You play repeated rounds, choosing to cooperate or defect against classic strategies — always-cooperate, always-defect, tit-for-tat, grudger, random — and watch your scores accumulate. Facing tit-for-tat yourself reveals the lesson: defection wins a single round but loses the long game, while cooperation compounds when the other player reciprocates.